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AbStrACt  Fragments from the prehistory of radar are analyzed to advance a notion of lo-
gistical media. Logistical media order and arrange people and objects and subtly influence
our experiences of space and time (Case, 2010). Logistical media emphasize logistics, feedback,
and remote control in communication. They gesture to the work of Innis (1951, 1972), Wiener
(1948/1961, 1954), Carey (1988), Mumford (1964), and Virilio (1989, 1994), and to the trans-
mission model of communication. This article considers the torpedo, searchlight, war horn,
and death ray logistically and as they prefigure radar. The analysis of other logistical media
is suggested.
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rÉSUMÉ  Dans cet article, nous analysons certains éléments de la préhistoire du radar pour
souligner l’idée de médias logistiques. Ces derniers ordonnent et arrangent les gens et objets
et influencent de manière subtile nos expériences de l’espace et du temps. Ils mettent l’accent
sur la logistique, la rétroaction et le contrôle à distance en communication. Ils évoquent en
outre l’œuvre d’Harold Innis, Norbert Wiener, James W. Carey, Lewis Mumford et Paul Virilio,
ainsi que le modèle transitif de la communication. Cet article considère la torpille, le
projecteur, le cor de guerre et le rayon de la mort d’un point de vue logistique, en tant que
précurseurs du radar. Il propose par la suite l’analyse d’autres médias logistiques.
MotS CLÉS  Médias logistiques; Radar; Histoire; École de Toronto; Cybernétique
radar, like radio, was developed at sea before it took to the air. In this article, I pres-ent fragments from radar’s prehistory that ﬁrst locate it in the watery—rather
than in the ethereal—domain. I consider torpedoes, searchlights, war horns, death
rays, and related technologies. I draw on documents from MIt’s radiation Lab and on
other sources derived from those documents. My intent is to consider issues of logistics,
feedback, and remote control and to advance a notion of logistical media. Formally, I
address the questions “what are logistical media?” “How is radar a logistical medium?”
and especially, “How do fragments from radar’s prehistory inform an understanding
of logistical media?” In conclusion, I suggest the analysis of other logistical media.1
In simple terms, logistical media are media of orientation. they order and arrange
people and objects. Case (2010) writes that logistical media
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intrude, almost imperceptibly, on our experiences of space and time, even as
they represent them. they are devices of cognitive, social, and political coor-
dination that are so fundamentally communications media that they intersect
and envelop much of our lives without conscious awareness. Lighthouses,
clocks, global positioning systems, temples, maps, calendars, telescopes, and
highways are just a few of them. In modern terms logistical media are at once
bureaucratic and militaristic. they intersect issues of social organization,
power, and economics. (p. 1)
Logistical media gesture to the roots of the transmission model of communication—
the sender-message-channel-receiver-feedback model—to the foundational work in
military science, network theory, telecommunications, and cybernetics that preoccu-
pied thinkers such as Norbert wiener, Alan turing, warren weaver, and Pyotr
Anokhin. Logistical media are not usually considered in terms of Hall’s (1980) encod-
ing/decoding thesis, and are not necessarily concerned with issues of cultural repre-
sentation. Instead, when logistical media are considered in terms of sender, message,
channel, receiver, and feedback, location, movement, angle, force, and acceleration
leap to the fore.
Logistical media share a grid-like functioning that gestures to theorists of media
and technology such as Harold Innis, James Carey, Lewis Mumford, and Paul Virilio.
these theorists elucidate points of view, lines of communication and transportation,
and movements of centralization and decentralization. In short, logistical media afﬁrm
Carey’s (1988) observation that “the grid is the geometry of empire” (p. 225).
radar, or acronymically, radio detection and ranging, exempliﬁes the transmis-
sion model of communication, including its notion of feedback (Shannon & weaver,
1949; wiener, 1961). radar projects electromagnetic waves, receives those waves that
hit reﬂective objects, measures wavelength and frequency, and uses such measure-
ments to calculate the speed, range, altitude, and acceleration of objects. In a sense, a
radar transmitter resembles a tuning fork. If a tuning fork is stricken, it vibrates and
sound waves radiate from it. when a radar transmitter is stricken by an alternating
current of electricity, it emanates electromagnetic radiation.
radar’s measurement of feedback, of the diminished waves that bounce off ob-
jects, is both necessary and useful. Case (2010) observes:
because the speed of electromagnetic waves is known (in a vacuum, they
travel at exactly 299, 792, 458 meters per second) the time between transmis-
sion and reception provides the range (or distance) from the object to the
transmitter. Moreover, an object’s (or target’s, as the terms are interchange-
able in radar parlance) location in angle to the transmitter can be learned by
pointing the transmitter and receiver (often they are the same antenna) at
different angles and observing which angle produces the strongest echo, the
echo with the least frequency loss. once the distance and angle are known,
speed, azimuth, altitude, and even acceleration can be measured by repeat-
edly hitting the object with waves. Not all of the waves bounce back to the re-
ceiver (in fact, only a tiny fraction of them do), and those that don’t are clutter,
or noise, in the system. (p. 34)
radar uses feedback to increase remote control, to collect information, and to
order and arrange objects at a distance. Media, and technologies generally, have been
considered in terms of logistics and remote control by various theorists—Mumford
(1964), Carey (1988), and Virilio (1989, 1994), among them—but most usefully, in
terms of radar, by Innis (1951, 1972) and wiener (1954, 1961). Innis discusses how, on
the level of governance, forms of communication remotely order and arrange people
and objects. He is concerned with the time-bias or space bias of particular media, and
with their cultural, economic, and political consequences. In his terms, radar’s
ephemeral, high-speed transmissions of information contribute to a glut of space-bi-
ased media that further colossal, centre-heavy, and unstable governance. He writes
that because of this glut, “the balance between time and space has been seriously dis-
turbed with disastrous consequences to western civilization” (1951, p. 76).
water and the movement of objects—fur, money, timber, ﬁsh, industrial com-
modities, and people, for example—are integral to Innis’ approach to communication
and governance. Empire and Communications (1972) elaborates how Egyptian space
formed around the Nile, how objects ﬂowed through Egypt, and how the empire’s gov-
ernmental, military, and religious structures took shape. The Bias of Communication
(1951) depicts media as points for the collection and dispersal of information, wealth,
and power. For Innis, information, wealth, and power pile up at ports, ﬂy from radio
towers, and move from forests to mills to the folds of newspapers. His early work The
Fur Trade in Canada (1977) is replete with descriptions of water’s mediations of move-
ment, power, and the ﬂow of people and goods. In many ways, Innis’ watery logistics
preﬁgure my discussion of radar’s development at sea.
wiener (1954, 1961) was contributing to the development of radar when he artic-
ulated his notion of feedback, and when he subsequently ﬁtted it into Shannon and
weaver’s (1949) transmission model of communication. wiener was fascinated by tech-
nologies’ capacity to order and arrange humanity. He understood that radar systems
were fundamentally concerned with communication. He observed that 
[t]he technique of radar used the same modalities as the existing technique
of radio besides inventing new ones of its own. It was thus natural to consider
radar as a branch of communication theory. besides ﬁnding airplanes by radar
it was necessary to shoot them down. (p. 148) 
the processes of remotely detecting, ordering, and controlling movement that support
wiener’s descriptions of “ﬁnding” and “shooting” are central to logistical media.
Consistent with Innis’ discussions of space, order, and governance, and with
wiener’s descriptions of information transmission, torpedoes, searchlights, and war
horns are logistical media that use feedback to remotely control people and objects in
space. they are detectors, orderers, and arrangers. they establish points of view, be-
come collection points for information, reinforce and extend nation-states’ borders,
and preﬁgure radar as a logistical medium.
the MIt rad Lab documents stored at the New England branch of the National
Archives and records Administration in waltham, Massachusetts, are the basis of my
effort. the rad Lab, which was founded in November 1940 and which produced work-
ing radars in 1941, relied on the experimental, haphazard efforts of the Naval research
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Laboratory and the U.S. Army Signal Corps, efforts that stretched back to the early
1920s. because of this reliance, the rad Lab established a Historian’s ofﬁce to preserve
the collective effort, and record Group 227, which I have delved into, is the result. the
rad Lab grew immensely with the entrance of the United States into world war II, de-
veloping from a small, experimental operation of “less than 50 workers with 10,000
[square] feet of space in the Electrical Engineering department in November, 1940, to
a labyrinthine ‘skunk works’ of nearly 3,000 workers and almost 500,000 square feet
of space in 1943” (Guerlac, 1945, as cited in Case, 2010, p. 114). rad Lab historian Henry
Guerlac’s description of the sea-, ground-, and air-based logistics performed by the
rad Lab’s radars gives a sense of the varieties of orderings and arrangements. Guerlac
(1945) recorded:
the Laboratory has developed, with the approval and sometimes the insis-
tence of the Services, airborne interception equipment for night ﬁghters, air-
borne radar for the detection of surface craft, as well as radar for early warning
against aircraft, for height-ﬁnding and ground control of aircraft, for harbor
defense, for the direction of guided missiles, for anti-aircraft ﬁre control with
automatic following of the target, for blind landing of aircraft, for low- and
high-altitude bombing through overcast, for navigational aids. (p. 2)
despite the sweeping logistics that Guerlac evokes, practical concerns prevent me from
weaving a contextually nuanced narrative. Instead, I have analyzed the sparest of frag-
ments of radar’s prehistory. My approach is not novel, though. As Lotringer suggested
during his interview of the logistically minded Virilio, so it is here: “your approach …
is resolutely telescopic. As soon as you hook something, you let it go, you jump aside
instead of saturating the area you had invested. It’s a whole politics of writing” (Virilio
& Lotringer, 1997, p. 44). In the spirit of quick movements and momentary orientations,
my aim is to sketch logistical media’s “points” and “lines,” or as Virilio says, to “reach
the tendency” (p. 44). 
there is, however, a logical ﬂow to my analysis. I discuss torpedoes, searchlights,
war horns, and death rays in terms of logistics, feedback, and remote control, and do
so with an eye for radar. I analyze the nineteenth-century torpedo as a cybernetic de-
vice that exploited the feedback systems of the time, extended nation-states, acceler-
ated the technological race, impacted logistics, and eventually created a need for radar.
I describe how searchlights emerged as feedback systems to warn of torpedoes, lacked
channel control, and were deployed in conjunction with war horns. I present war horns
as macrophones that did not provide range information, had unique noise problems,
incorporated their function into their architecture, and suggested issues of weather
and the natural world. I consider death rays as destructive transmissions and as a failed
hope through which, in some measure, radar emerged. Along the way I also brieﬂy
consider other media and technologies.
The locomotive torpedo and searchlight
Since at least the days when signal ﬁres, church steeples, and lighthouses were the pre-
dominant optical telegraphs, nation-states have used logistical media. Nevertheless,
by 1805, the advance of explosive, tide-driven naval vessels called torpedoeswould for-
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ever change how nation-states understand and extend themselves through space. As
Smart (1959) notes:
In 1805, robert Fulton, in an experiment before ranking members of the british
Admiralty, proved the practicability of submerged explosions by blowing up
the brig dorotHEA.… two “torpedoes” were armed and tied to 80 foot
lengths of line trailing from small [dinghies]. “Each boat having a torpedo in
the stern, they started from the shore about a mile from the brig, and rowed
down [toward] her; the uniting line of the torpedoes being stretched to the
full extent, the two boats were distant from each other seventy feet.… As soon
as the connecting line of the torpedoes passed the buoy of the brig, they were
thrown into the water and carried on by the tide.” Contemporary accounts re-
port dorotHEA was raised bodily into the air and broken in two. (p. 97)
the tide was no longer the means of delivery when in 1860, Giovanni Lupis, a cap-
tain in the Austro-Hungarian Navy, demonstrated the ﬁrst locomotive torpedo, a re-
motely controlled, cybernetic device that touched off unparalleled orderings and
arrangements, and eventually, created a need for radar. Lupis’ torpedo was simple: he
attached steering ropes and a clockwork engine to a boat with triggers on the bow,
mast, and sides, and then ﬁlled the stern with explosives (routledge, 1903). At only a
knot or two, Lupis’ device was a deadly marionette, but one that would never hit
enemy ships that saw it coming. Naval vessels of the day could easily outrun it, and re-
loading the launching apparatus required an inordinate amount of time. the Lupis
torpedo was most effective at night, when the sight, hearing, and diligence of enemy
sailors were at their worst, and when ships were often anchored. Considering the short-
comings of Lupis’ torpedo, “the Austrian authorities felt that the system of guidance
was impractical and that the methods of obtaining motive power, by clockwork or
steam power, were objectionable” (burns, 1988, p. 3). Lupis’ torpedo was too slow and
awkward a logistical medium; it failed to effectively extend Austro-Hungarian space.
but it was a logistical medium, and one that disrupted enemy trafﬁc formations
such as commute (convoy), gridlock (blockade), collision (ramming and bombard-
ment), and parking (station keeping).2 As a literal, physical extension of Lupis’ arms
the torpedo was an armament; the steering ropes gave him control that became more
remote and tenuous as the torpedo became increasingly distant. Lupis used his eyes
to see the torpedo and target, and his muscles to channel the torpedo through the
waves and currents as a form of telecommunication. Lupis’ torpedo was force in the
sense mentioned by Archimedes, the ancient Greek mathematician and militarist: it
exerted force on the ocean as it displaced water and on its target through collision and
explosion (Steele & dorland, 2005). Subtexts of nationalism, militarism, and econom-
ics (e.g., “I can destroy your expensive capital ship with a torpedo that costs pennies
on the dollar!”) can also be part of torpedoes’ transmissions.
Still, despite his government’s rejection, Lupis’ torpedo was not quite dead in the
water. In the early 1860s Lupis met robert whitehead, a british engineer with access
to sophisticated production facilities. with whitehead’s innovations Lupis’ torpedo
was soon faster, submersible, and self-steering. It could be launched quickly from ship
or shore and was a candidate for large-scale production and distribution. by 1876, tor-
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pedoes travelled at 18 knots and the british Admiralty was buying the rights to manu-
facture them by the thousands. An 1873 report from the british torpedo Committee
declared that “any maritime nation failing to provide itself with submarine locomotive
torpedoes would be neglecting a great source of power, both for offence and defence”
(burns, 1988, p. 3). Any nation-state that failed to use torpedoes would neglect the po-
tential to buttress its border and compromise others’ borders.
the arrival of the Lupis torpedo accelerated the technological race. thereafter, in-
expensive, low-proﬁle torpedo boats were designed and built, destroyers were made
to take out the torpedo boats, and torpedo nets were manufactured to protect ships at
anchor. Nineteenth-century torpedo nets were made of steel rings and extended to
more than 20 feet below the surface of the water; like Victorian hoop skirts they kept
untoward advances at a distance, but also slowed vessels. Naval historian russell burns
observes that “the relatively small size of torpedo boats, apart from leading to low con-
struction costs, made them difﬁcult targets to observe at night. torpedo nets could be
used by ships at anchor, and until about 1880 they were the principle means of defence
against nighttime torpedo attacks” (burns, 1988, p. 5). with the nets out, the ships of
1880 only moved at about three knots, and their ability to manoeuvre, remain in for-
mation, and keep up with a convoy was hampered (watts, 1971). torpedo nets, while
protecting individual water craft and the sailors in them, compromise a battle group’s
orderliness and effectiveness. the mere possibility of a torpedo launch wreaks havoc
with naval logistics. For potential targets, the point of view created by the lighthouse,
spyglass, and lookout post is no longer adequate. threats can emerge quickly, with
torpedoes unknown until after their detonations.
Still, the view through the looking glass serves modern attackers. It encourages
psychological distance from acts of destruction and killing, distance that was difﬁcult
to maintain in the swashbuckling days of ramming and boarding, and even of simple
gunﬁre. Cannons and deck guns are a step in the direction of torpedoes in their as-
sembly line operation: they divide the labour of loading, aiming, and ﬁring, and hence
the cannonball always arrives, step by step, on the enemy’s deck without singular re-
sponsibility. but cannons and deck guns are aimed at persons as well as vessels, and
retain the trappings of interpersonal warfare. torpedoes are aimed at masses, at ships
themselves, and enemy sailors become ill-deﬁned occupants of targets (brown, 1999).
Consider German lieutenant otto weddigen’s (1914) account of the ﬁrst U-boat am-
bush of a british convoy:
when I ﬁrst sighted them they were near enough for torpedo work, but I
wanted to make my aim sure, so I went down and in on them. I had taken the
position of the three ships before submerging, and I succeeded in getting an-
other ﬂash through my periscope before I began action. I soon reached what
I regarded as a good shooting point. then I loosed one of my torpedoes at the
middle ship. I was then about twelve feet under water, and got the shot off in
good shape, my men handling the boat as if she had been a skiff. I climbed to
the surface to get a sight through my tube of the effect, and discovered that
the shot had gone straight and true, striking the ship, which I later learned
was the Aboukir, under one of her magazines, which in exploding helped the
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torpedo’s work of destruction.… but soon the other two English cruisers
learned what had brought about the destruction so suddenly. As I reached my
torpedo depth I sent a second charge at the nearest of the oncoming vessels,
which was the Hogue. the English were playing my game… (p. 1)
weddigen observed and ﬁred on the ships. His men loaded, aimed, and launched the
torpedoes, but he had the thrill of command. He looked for feedback from a distance,
for the effect of his transmission. He enjoyed his “game.” weddigen exempliﬁed re-
mote-controlled warfare, warfare that would soon progress beyond the U-boat captain’s
quick look at a greyish, blob-like enemy to a blip on a radar screen.
to reduce the power of torpedoes’ transmissions, lookouts needed to see torpe-
does before they arrived. In logistical terms, lookouts needed quick, efﬁcient ways to
predict torpedoes’ movements. turn-of-the-century militarists considered searchlights
just the thing; unlike lighthouses they were mobile, could be enclosed in directional
hoods, swiveled about, focused, angled, and otherwise adjusted (Hezlet, 1975). they
weren’t (and aren’t) particularly useful for seeing torpedoes arriving underwater—that
is, for seeing them advance through space—but searchlights were able to spot torpedo
boats, which helped forecast torpedoes. the notion that searchlights were ﬁrst con-
ceived to help locate sailors thrown overboard during rough seas does not hold up
under investigation. Searchlights increased the speed and reliability of feedback for
lookouts and were the business end of early warning systems. they were also, as burns
(1988) notes, a crucial link in the development of radar:
the searchlight detection and location system has some similarities to a radar
surveillance system, viz: a) the use of electromagnetic radiation and a pow-
erful radiation source; b) the utilization of means to focus the radiation in a
narrow beam to increase the radiation ﬂux in a given direction and hence in-
crease the detection range of the system; c) the employment of a mounting
which allows the beam to be swept over a given region and which enables
the bearing of an object to be determined; d) the incorporation of a sub-sys-
tem within the overall system, able to detect and track a given object. (p. 6)
However, the limitations of searchlights are legion. As logistical media they are
mostly useful during nighttime or inclement weather. Moreover, bright, sweeping
lights tell an enemy ﬂeet exactly where to aim. If the lights are placed too low, their
ranges are shortened. If too high, there is a risk of passing above torpedo boats and
failing to detect them. In rough seas a ship rolls and lists, making the ideal position of
searchlights anything but ﬁxed. As a logistical medium, the naval searchlight tries to
arrange objects in space so that torpedo boats remain at a maximum distance. this al-
lows ships to react to torpedo attacks, but at the same time makes ships sitting ducks.
the point of view established by the searchlight becomes an obvious point for attack.
the searchlight lacks 24-hour utility and channel control (or privacy)—most anyone
can receive and interpret its transmissions.
radar, being outside the spectrum of visible light, remedies this situation. Just
like bentham’s Panopticon that Foucault employed, radar unfastens seeing from being
seen, an unfastening that, in Innis’ formulation of space-biased media, can contribute
to centre-heavy governance. there is a loss of privacy for people who do not know
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they are being observed and whose movements can be measured and recorded in a
government’s or military’s database.
The war horn
the interim between searchlights and effective radar (a period from approximately
the early 1880s to 1941, in the U.S.) was ﬁlled with attempts to improve the former via
powerful listening devices, what are alternately referred to as war horns, acoustic loca-
tors, orthophones, sound mirrors, static dishes, or static walls (Scarth, 1999). Each of
these was developed and deployed according to a naval logic—but was also tasked
with atmospheric responsibilities.
In 1880, Scientific American
(“Navigation in Fogs”) featured
Alfred Mayer’s topophone (or
“sound placer”). Mayer’s contrap-
tion looked like a stethoscope with
two reﬂectors mounted on an un-
dersized ox collar (see Figure 1).
Shortly thereafter, large devices
with ranges of 20 to 30 miles were
placed on the decks of ships and
along coastlines so that the direc-
tion of emergency whistles could
be ascertained in dense fog, ice-
bergs and other navigational obsta-
cles could be heard in time for
course correction, and searchlights
could be aimed tactically and inter-
mittently at enemies. A chronicle of
radar’s prehistory details the devel-
opment and abilities of these listen-
ing devices:
Acoustical sound detectors, giving a rough indication of direction by means
of applying the binaural principle seems to have begun, at least on the allied
side, with the orthophone, an extremely simple device used in the French
Army in 1917. At roughly the same time an experimental acoustical detector
of the reﬂector type was produced in England by the Anti-Aircraft Section
(under A.V. Hill) of the Munitions Invention department.… despite their in-
trinsic weaknesses these devices were brought to a high pitch of perfection
just before [world war II]. In 1936 an error of only a quarter degree was
claimed on ﬁxed sounds, and for an airplane ﬂying at “reasonable” heights
all sound locator manufacturers quoted two-degree accuracies. (“the origins
of radar,” 1945, p. 3)
war horns, developed in at least one instance by a Munitions Invention
department, were passively logistical. they detected sound waves, but didn’t project
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Figure 1: The sound placer
Source: Scientific American (1880, July 3), p. 8
them. they made their operators collection points for information, and often, the de-
cision-making processors who joined two otherwise distinct media—sound detectors
and searchlights. but in another way they were active: they made previously unheard
sounds receivable, and in so doing made the producers of the sounds unwitting—and
unwilling—providers of feedback. war horns left eavesdropping a silent, controlled,
and coordinated form of large-scale information gathering, with the whisperings of
motors, cries of migrating birds, and rumblings of icebergs the content. world war I’s
air battles rendered sound detection even more important, as the speed of warfare
complicated early warning, and as war itself became remote from its coordinators. A
rad Lab historian observed:
Although from the point of view of the present war [world war II] aircraft
played a wholly auxiliary role in the last war [world war I], its potentialities
having been scarcely exploited, this threat had given rise to methods of de-
tection that depended upon tell-tale information emanating from the plane
itself. Apart from visual spotting and telephonic reporting, the chief methods
depended upon the detection and ampliﬁcation of information involuntarily
supplied by the approaching plane. these were detection and location by
means of 1) the sound of the aircraft engine, and 2) electromagnetic radiation
having its source in the plane. (“the origins of radar,” 1945, pp. 2–3)
war horns upgraded searchlights, a necessity as war accelerated. they relied on
sound, on feedback not compromised by the presence of the sun, and so they were
equally useful day and night. when employed in conjunction with war horns, search-
lights ﬂared with a speed approaching that of a volley of musket ﬁre, and with about
the same danger of giving away a ship’s position. war horn–steered searchlights
popped on and off like extended ﬂashbulbs, giving snapshots of a target’s location
moments before gunﬁre arrived. In a sense, the war horn, searchlight, and deck gun
are synchronized extensions of their operators’ ears, eyes, and hands, respectively.
they extend nation-states’ capacities for surveillance, eavesdropping, and the projec-
tion of force.
but while war horns were useful 24 hours a day, improved the efﬁciency of search-
lights, and did not give away ships’ positions, they had their own problems. Put simply,
war horns of the 1930s and 1940s “gave no range information; their performance de-
pended on the wind, and they were quite unreliable on gusty days; and lastly their
range was so short … that with the high speed of modern planes” they were too slow
and limited for practical use (“the origins of radar,” 1945, p. 3). war horns extended
the ears of their operators, but the points of listening they established lacked some of
the grid-making qualities of searchlights’ points of view. war horns, like compasses, dis-
cerned direction but not distance. they presumed a grid whereon objects were logisti-
cally signiﬁcant, but the distance between objects remained unknown and unknowable.
they also expanded the logistical role of wind. No longer would commanders only
verify that enemy troops were downwind from discharging mustard gas, or have
snipers compensate for crosswinds before shooting. the development of war horns
and other acoustic locators fostered hope that technologies would be developed that
could minimize wind’s signiﬁcance as a source of noise. In the meantime, weather
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forecasting was important. In the 1930s weather reports were, more than ever, factored
into decisions about the movements of military ships and planes. during war, blustery
days increased the likelihood of sneak attacks and therefore demanded increased readi-
ness (Scarth, 1999). I can only guess what might have happened if someone had
adapted the wind machine—the silk-covered, slatted, rotating drum that richard
Strauss used for his 1897 symphony, Don Quixote: Fantastic Variations on a Theme of
Knightly Character—to turn-of-the-century warfare (one thing is certain: the military
would have been literally tilting with a wind machine).
In the 1930s, hopes for acoustic location were such that massive acoustic locators,
static walls, and sound mirrors were built on the English coast (Scarth, 1999). they had
greater range than war horns (perhaps exempting the Japanese war tubas, the large, pow-
erful war horns deployed to protect their home islands), because they effectively received
longer wavelengths and were ﬁtted with state-of-the-art microphones that were wired
to listening stations. Amplifying the detected sounds and sending them to remote lis-
teners allowed eavesdropping networks to form, even as it isolated eavesdroppers from
the spaces they monitored. Static walls and sound mirrors were architectural demarca-
tions of the soils of nation-states—of secure homelands—but like the medieval ramparts
that preceded them, they were also architectures of advance. the keep’s territory ex-
tended to the range of bowshots, catapults, and spyglasses; media with greater ranges
mean more controllable territory. Static walls, with their connections to searchlights and
anti-aircraft ﬁre, merely incorporated detection into the physical barriers themselves.
war horns and static walls did not live up to expectations. In 1934, britain con-
ducted a now infamous test of its air defence capabilities, a test conducted in the face
of growing anxiety over Nazi Germany (batt, 1991). Following the test, Air Ministry of-
ﬁcial H. E. wimperis wanted to halt the acoustic detection program. According to radar
historian Penley (2002):
to give time for their guns to engage enemy aircraft as they came over, the
Army was experimenting with the sound detection of aircraft by using mas-
sive concrete acoustic mirrors with microphones at their focal points. dr. H.E.
wimperis, the director of Scientiﬁc research for the Air Ministry, and his as-
sistant, Mr. A.P. rowe, arranged for Air Marshall dowding to visit the Army
site on the romney Marshes to see a demonstration. on the morning of the
test the experiment was completely wrecked by a milk cart rattling by. rowe
was so concerned by this failure that he gathered up all the Air Ministry ﬁles
on the subject of Air defence. He was so appalled that he wrote formally to
wimperis to say that if we were involved in a major war we would lose it un-
less something new could be discovered to change the situation. (p. 1)
At the same time, American researchers were not only trying to reﬁne war horns, they
were also attempting thermal and electromagnetic detection. In the mid-1930s, “both
thermal detection and microwave radio experiments” were being conducted at the
Army Signal Corps laboratories in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey (“the Signal Corps.
development of U.S. Army radar development Part I,” n.d., p. 3). In 1938 a thermal
detector was installed in a truck and was ﬁeld tested. Its performance was underwhelm-
ing. the ofﬁcial report found:
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with thermal detector, day and night range on the plane … was about 4,000
yards … for commercial ships leaving New york Harbor, about 8,000 yards.
Angular accuracy seemed to be about two degrees on ships, not above 10,000
yards. beyond about 7,000 yards the impression was that the response was
not entirely certain and positive, although more experience and training
might improve the impression. (Hulburt, 1938, p. 1)
this performance led the ofﬁcial observer to conclude:
Sensitivity has been sacriﬁced to speed of response … a better detector for
ships could be devised … [I think the] Army will not entertain further devel-
opment of thermal devices for airplane location because of the better promise
of radio devices and because the thermal radiations from airplanes can be
screened, if necessary … (Hulburt, 1938, p. 1)
Hulburt’s prediction notwithstanding, acoustic and thermal feedback systems
have since been deployed as foils for one another. In an effort to eavesdrop on slower,
more sedentary violations of national space, micro war horns—microphones—have
been placed, for example, in the nostril of a wooden eagle outside the residence of the
U.S. Ambassador to russia (wallace, Melton, & Schlesinger, 2008), stationed near na-
tional borders and drug trafﬁcking routes (Eldridge, Ginsburg, Hempel, Kephart, &
Moore, 2004; Pomfret & Farah, 1998), and used to monitor conversations and interna-
tional telephone calls (risen, 2005). the macrophones of war preceded the micro-
phones of espionage and national security.
The death ray
In casual discourse, Guglielmo Marconi is often considered the inventor of radio, as
though it sprang from him fully formed, like Athena from the forehead of Zeus. Such
consideration fails to account for the complex interweaving of economic, technological,
and social forces that enmesh all inventors, and perpetuates a complacent acceptance
of technologies as applied. In Marconi’s case, the focus on him as a creator-genius min-
imizes the fact that he plays an important role in the industrialization of invention,
the adaptation of the assembly line to production, the struggles for patents and na-
tional privilege, and the rise of Mussolini’s fascism.4
In the tradition of optical telegraphy, after which the telegraph and beacon hills
of many cities are named, Marconi ascended hills to avoid their interfering with his
transmissions. that interference could be feedback, could be used to calculate speed,
range, altitude, and acceleration, was only important to him later in life. In a speech to
the Institute of radio Engineers in 1922 he stated:
As was ﬁrst shown by Hertz, electric waves can be completely reﬂected by
conducting bodies. In some of my tests, I have noticed the effects of reﬂection
and deﬂection of these waves by metallic objects miles away. It seems to me
that it should be possible to design apparatus by means of which a ship could
radiate or project a divergent beam of these rays in any desired direction,
which rays, if coming across a metallic object, such as another steamer or
ship, would be reﬂected back to a receiver screened from the local transmitter
on the sending ship, and thereby immediately reveal the presence and bear-
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ing of the other ship in fog or thick weather. one further great advantage of
such an arrangement would be that it would be able to give warning of the
presence and bearing of ships, even should these ships be unprovided with
any kind of radio. I have brought these results and ideas to your notice as I
feel—and perhaps you will agree with me—that the study of short electric
waves, although sadly neglected practically all through the history of wireless,
is still likely to develop in many unexpected directions, and open up new
ﬁelds of proﬁtable research. (p. 237)
In the age of the airplane, Marconi’s observations are still “out to sea”—he’s think-
ing of naval feedback and remote control. Nevertheless, Marconi does pull together
his rivals’ earlier, disparate ruminations. Some of his rivals, and especially Lee de Forest
and Nicola tesla, had been holding forth publicly on electromagnetic detection and
remote control as early as the turn of the century. they had even noted that the differ-
ence between a detector and a destructor is one of frequency and amplitude.5 when
the French battleship Iena exploded in 1907, electromagnetic waves were considered
a possible cause. de Forest thought this unlikely, but not impossible. According to the
New York Times (1907):
[de Forest] recalled the experiments of Nicola tesla with a dirigible torpedo
about the time of the Spanish-American war. tesla then considered the prob-
lem of the use of wireless telegraphy for directing torpedoes and discharging
them. It was tesla’s theory that a torpedo’s movements could be controlled
by means of waves of electrical energy, and he made many experiments to
this end, but with no practical results. At that time tesla made the statement
that in the same manner he could project a wave of sufﬁcient intensity to
cause a spark in a ship’s magazine and explode it. (“wireless Caused Irena
disaster?”)
tesla’s (1907) estimation of his own successes and intentions was different. In a
letter to the editor of the New York Times, written the day of (and published the day
after) de  Forest’s comments, he argued:
A report in the Times of this morning says that I have attained no practical
results with my dirigible wireless torpedo. I have constructed such machines,
and shown them in operation on frequent occasions. they have worked per-
fectly and everybody who saw them was amazed at their performance. It is
true that my efforts to have this novel means for attack and defense adopted
by our Government have been unsuccessful, but this is no discredit to my in-
vention.… the time is not yet ripe for the telautomatic art. If its possibilities
were appreciated the nations would not be building large battleships. Such a
ﬂoating fortress may be safe against an ordinary torpedo, but would be help-
less in a battle with a machine which carries twenty tons of explosive, moves
swiftly underwater, and is controlled with precision by an operator beyond
the range of the largest gun. As to projecting wave-energy to any particular
region of the globe, I have given a clear description of the means in technical
publications. Not only can this be done by the means of my devices, but the
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spot at which the desired effect is to be produced can be calculated very
closely… (n.p.)
beyond the fact that it is difﬁcult to know when electromagnetic feedback systems
were operational through the words of Marconi, tesla, and de Forest, the differences
between searchlights and radar have immense logistical importance. radar equipment
serves 24 hours a day and without the fatigue of human sight. Enemies could not
detect its use without comparable equipment and, at least in the early years, would
ﬁnd the task difﬁcult even if they had such equipment. radar extended combat be-
yond the range of guns and natural sight. with sufﬁcient power it extended a nation-
state’s reach anywhere in the world.
Amidst the fallout of world war I, the western powers were taken with airplanes’
transformation of the nation-state’s reach and with the means of controlling and de-
stroying airplanes. As would-be electromagnetic weapons capable of destroying air-
planes, death rays are important to radar’s prehistory. “the inventors of a ‘death ray’
multiply every day,” says the May 29, 1924, New York Times (“the ‘death ray’ rivals”),
with scientists from the U.S., britain, Germany, and russia all claiming to have devel-
oped devices that would “bring down airplanes, stop tank engines, and ‘spread a curtain
of death’”(p. A4). Public fascination with death rays was drummed up by high-proﬁle,
crackpot inventors (and later by boris Karloff in the ﬁlm The Invisible Ray). but the hor-
rors of trench warfare fomented genuine enthusiasm for remote, high-speed transmis-
sion weapons. Military ofﬁcials with bloated post-war budgets were looking for clean
killing through unproven devices. the U.S. Navy was interested in inventor Grindell
Matthews’ death ray (“U.S. Navy Enters race of Nations for death ray,” 1924). the U.S.
Army made inquiries of a German scientist who had developed “a method of producing
invisible rays capable of stopping airplanes in midair and automobiles” (“American
Army offered death ray, He Asserts,” 1924). German general Freiherr Von Schoenich
fantasized about death rays and other remote weapons. According to the New York
Times (1924):
General Freiherr Von Schoenich has issued a book, “the war of 1930,” in
which he describes how a third war between France and Germany will be car-
ried on. … German death ray machines will be uncovered on the whole
French border. … thousands of French airplanes will try to ﬂy to Germany,
but most of them will be destroyed by the death ray. (“Fierce war of 1930
Pictured by German”)
Von Schoenich sees death rays as besting the airplane’s speedy, border-compro-
mising, remote attacks. death rays’ post-war allure was more than public obsession
with scientiﬁc whimsy or hoped-for telautomatic art. Legitimate organizations like the
U.S.’ Committee for Scientiﬁc Survey for Air defense put time and resources into de-
veloping an electromagnetic death ray that could “be used to strengthen present meth-
ods of defense against hostile aircraft” (Minutes of the Meetings of the Committee for
Scientiﬁc Survey for Air defense, 1935, p. 1).
Still, not everyone was enthralled with death rays, with transmission-as-destruc-
tion; many researchers concerned with logistics were developing radar. In the U.S., the
Naval research Laboratory conducted radar experiments as early as 1922, and that
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year pioneered the ﬁrst radar-based speed trap when its antennas detected a moving
truck some 70 metres distant (“the origins of radar,” 1945). In britain, physicist-me-
teorologist robert watson-watt was convinced that “radio-destruction” systems were
not feasible. burns (1988) writes, “[o]n the question of whether rapidly moving targets
could be immobilized, watson-watt assumed that bombing aircraft of the ‘immediate’
future would be all-metal monoplanes with cowled engines and screened ignition sys-
tems” (p. 123). with world war II looming, watson-watt believed “the most attractive
scheme” to project britain into the atmosphere “was that in which zones of short-
wave radio illumination were set up through which an approaching airplane had to
ﬂy” (burns, 1988, p. 123). His efforts led to 20 CH (Chain Home) radar stations on the
british coast by the spring of 1939. these stations were the ﬁrst large-scale, working
radar network in the world (Allison, 1984).
Conclusion
My rapid-ﬁre descriptions of mostly forgotten instances and events, of fragments from
the development of the torpedo, searchlight, war horn, and death ray, have suggested
the otherwise unremarked signiﬁcance of radar’s prehistory. I have intended these frag-
ments from MIt’s rad Lab, and from the fragments that expanded from them, to facil-
itate an understanding of logistical media that is relevant in today’s drone-patrolled,
highly technological world where radar itself seems to be old technology. If torpedoes,
war horns, and death rays no longer seem to be forgotten artifacts of the watery domain,
or of the early days of the ethereal domain, if they seem connected to the radar systems
that today are deployed to detect underground tunnels between Egypt and Israel and
between Mexico and the United States, then my efforts have had the desired effect
(“Lockheed Martin developing Ground Penetrating radar for tunnel Finding,” 2009).
I have also intended to contribute to an understanding of the transmission model
of communication, including feedback, remote control, and the grid-like functioning
of logistical media. Innis’ theorizations of the relationship between media, governance,
and the movement of people and objects have aided my understanding of these con-
cepts, as has wiener’s application of feedback to anticipate and coordinate move-
ment—and even artillery ﬁre. together, these two theorists, along with the others I
have cited, marshal the orderings and arrangements that deﬁne logistical media. they
do this even though I have only broadly sketched the necessary “points” and “lines.”
the upshot of my fragmented approach is that, with the essential concepts in
place, other logistical media can be analyzed within a more contextualized framework.
we need not replicate Innis’ (1977) descriptions of the fur trade in Canada or charge
singularly into wiener’s (1961) theorizations of radar, but the military, industrial min-
ing, the aerospace industry, port security, weather bureaus, sonar, and petroleum com-
panies are just a few sites that evoke, through a logistical lens, issues that keep those
early studies pertinent. the ordering and arrangement of people and objects through
feedback, remote control, and technological grids ties otherwise disparate activities to-
gether, and does so in a way that helps us understand both history and the present
day. I hope that this article orients us to the logistical task at hand.
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Notes
1. Portions of this article have been excerpted and revised from Case (2010).
2. there was at least one instance in which the torpedo preﬁgured the automobile. Kirby (1999) wrote
that “Mr. Cunningham, an American shoemaker, built rocket torpedoes and once celebrated the 4th of
July by setting off one of his torpedoes up the town’s main street. It shot off at high speed scaring old
ladies and horses and ﬁnally came to rest in the butcher’s shop where it set ﬁre to the icebox” (p. 9).
3. this is further evidenced by a comprehensive report on the U.S. Army’s attempts to develop detection
technologies in the 1930s. 
“both thermal detection and microwave radio experiments were at this time
carried on by the Laboratories Sound and Light Section, which also was en-
trusted with visual signal lamps, underwater sound ranging and Field Artillery
sound ranging” (“the Signal Corps. development of U.S. Army radar
development Part I,” n.d., p. 3).
4. See douglas (1989) and Aitken (1976) for a treatment of Marconi and the military’s inﬂuence on
the development of radio.
5. tesla entertained the possibilities of electromagnetic detection and destruction as early as November
21, 1898. In his letter to the New York Sun, he talked about a “self-propelling machine, the motions of
which are governed by impressions received through the eye.” this “controlling device” could poten-
tially make guns obsolete.
Website
Scientific American (1880, July 3). UrL: http://www.douglasself.com/MUSEUM/CoMMS/ear/ear.htm
[december 8, 2009].
Film
The invisible ray. (1936). Hillyer, Lambert (director), & Grainger, Edmund (Producer). Universal City,
CA: Universal Pictures. 
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